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Hichilema and Another v Lungu and Another 
(2016/CC/0031) [2016] ZMCC 4 (5 September 2016)
Majority Judgment 
Muna Ndulo
The facts of this case were as follows: Following the August 11 Presidential 
and Parliamentary elections, the petitioners filed an election petition in 
the Constitutional Court to nullify the election of President Edgar Lungu, 
on the grounds that the conduct of the August 11 elections breached the 
Constitution, the electoral act and the electoral code of Zambia and that 
consequently, the incumbent was not validly elected. Articles 101 (5) and 
103 (2) of the Constitution state that election petitions filed pursuant to 
those provisions must be heard within 14 days. The petition was filed on the 
19th of August 2016, and as the 14 day period reached expiry, the hearing 
of the petition had not commenced. The full bench of the Constitutional 
Court decided unanimously on the night of Friday, September 2 2016, 
that a four day hearing of the petition would commence on Monday, 
September 5, 2016 and end on Thursday, September 8, 2016. Under this 
arrangement, the petitioners would have two days to present their case, 
and the respondent’s two days to defend it. However on the morning of 
September 5, when the court met, purportedly to begin trial, three judges 
(Mulonda, Mulenga, and Sitali) issued a majority ruling dismissing the 
petition on the grounds that the 14 day period had expired and that as a 
result, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the petition. Writing on behalf 
of the three judges, Judge Sitali wrote, “The period for hearing the petition 
is prescribed by the Constitution itself. The time frame is rigid and this 
Court has not been given discretion to enlarge time”. Deciding on the fate 
of the unheard petition, Judge Sitali noted, “the petition stood dismissed for 
want of prosecution…and therefore failed by reason of that technicality.”
In this commentary, I argue that the September 5 decision of Justices 
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Sitali, Mulonda and Mulenga to overturn a decision of the full bench 
made on September 2, was illegal, irregular, and of no legal effect. First, 
from the dissenting judgment of Judge Chibomba, we learn that the 
dissenting judges had very little time to read the majority judgment. This 
raises the following very serious questions: Exactly when and where did 
the Judges’ conference to overturn the September 2 decision and arrive at 
a new decision take place? Who called this meeting and in what context? 
How it is that three judges can overrule a properly constituted full bench 
decision at what was clearly an irregular meeting? Who reopened the 
issue? When was the application for reopening made and to whom? Was 
the application to reconsider the Friday ruling made to the full bench? 
When was the application heard? The only logical conclusion is that 
the three judges caucused over the weekend to arrive at the decision to 
overturn the full bench ruling. They made the decision and wrote the 
judgment without any submissions from the parties. This is conduct that 
clearly subverts the judicial system. 
Moreover, without any prior permission from the court, the lawyers of the 
respondent were not in court on Monday for the scheduled hearing of the 
case, stating that they did not want to participate in an illegality. A critical 
question that immediately comes to the fore is this: do lawyers appearing 
before a court have the authority to determine the illegality of an act? Is the 
determination of legality and illegality not a hallowed judicial function? 
Even in matters that touch on jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court 
to pronounce on its jurisdiction to hear a matter. However, in this case, 
the respondents absented themselves from court without permission. 
In so doing they not only demeaned the court, they also defiled the 
collective rights of the Zambian people that the Court represents. It was 
therefore unfortunate that the majority judgment, which condemned the 
disrespectful conduct of the petitioner’s lawyer, did not equally condemn 
the disrespectful behavior of counsel for the respondents. 
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While it was right for the court to admonish the petitioners’ lawyers for 
any misconduct, it is inconsistent and a show of partiality for the three 
judges not to censure the respondent’s lawyers for failing to show up 
in court on September 5. Unless of course, these lawyers sought and 
received permission at the irregular weekend meeting that overturned the 
majority verdict. An impartial court would have admonished both sides. 
Compounding the irregularities described, above, I argue that the so-
called judgment is wrong on the law, for the following reasons. 
(1) First, the weekend meeting of the three judges that overturned the 
September 2 ruling and produced a new ruling was irregular. It 
cannot be justified under any tenet of law known to the Zambian 
legal system or perceivable in any part of the common law legal 
tradition. There was no motion filed to revisit the issue and there 
were no new facts to reconsider. Moreover the petitioners had 
reasonably relied on the unanimous decision of the Constitutional 
Court and if judicial rulings prove unreliable, that signals the end 
of democracy. A sub-group cannot form itself out of the whole and 
overrule the whole. The attempt to overturn the full bench ruling is 
a subversion of the judicial system and calls into question the fitness 
of the three judges to hold judicial office. The three judges must read 
the Commonwealth Bangalore Principles on Judicial Conduct to 
learn about appropriate judicial conduct. 
(2) The remedy the three judges purported to give is not provided for by 
the Constitution. Article 103 (3) provides that “the Constitutional 
Court may, after hearing an election petition- (a) declare the election 
of the President-elect valid; or (b) nullify the election of the President-
elect and Vice President.” In their In their rush to deliver judgment, 
the three judges failed to read the law as it is; a court of law cannot 
give a remedy not provided in law. The purported majority judgment 
therefore has no legal basis.
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(3) On the question of the 14-day period, Article 103 (2) provides that 
“The Constitutional Court shall hear an election petition relating to 
the President-elect within fourteen days of the filing of the petition.” 
There is no consequence provided for exceeding 14 days. Besides, the 
section speaks about “hearing.” It nowhere mentions “determining.” 
The article seems to have been drafted along the lines of a similar 
provision in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. In marked contrast, the 
Kenyan provision talks about “hearing” and “determining”. Article 
140 (1) of the 2010 of the Kenyan Constitution provides that: “(a) 
A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to challenge the 
election of the President elect within seven days after the date of 
the declaration of the results of the Presidential election; (b) Within 
fourteen days after the filing of the petition, under clause (1) the 
Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision 
shall be final”. The three judges cited the 2013 Kenyan Supreme 
Court Presidential election petition as authority for their decision. 
Apart from the difference pointed out in the Kenyan provision 
concerning the 14-day limit, the Kenyan Supreme Court ensured 
that all evidence presented by the parties was admitted via affidavits 
and decided the case on the merits and not on procedural grounds. 
The Kenyan court used the pre-trial conference to lay the ground 
rules for the expeditious, fair, and efficient disposal of the petition. 
Judicial powers ought to be exercised judicially and judiciously. That 
is, judicial power must be exercised in the interest of substantial 
justice and not to defeat the common will of the people. 
(4) A hearing must be fair and equitable and not just a farce or a 
choreography of absurdities as was seen in this case. Article 103 
(2) should not and cannot be interpreted to deny petitioners their 
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard. A constitutional court 
ought not to pander to narrow constructions that leave substantial 
justice prostrate. Several courts from various parts of the world have 
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dealt with this matter. First, is R v. Sussex Justices, exp. McCarthy1, 
a leading English case on the impartiality and recusal of judges. It is 
famous for establishing the precedent that mere appearance of bias is 
sufficient to overturn a judicial decision. It also brought into common 
parlance the oft-quoted aphorism: “Not only must justice be done; 
it must also manifestly be seen to have been done.” Procedure and 
technicalities are handmaids of law, they should never be made a tool, 
to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive 
use. They should not become tyrannical masters and agents for the 
destruction of justice.
The above point may have been most eloquently stated by Justice 
Chuckwadifu Oputa in the Nigerian case of Aliu Bello & Others v. 
Attorney-General of Oyo State2 when he held:
The picture of law and its technical rules triumphant and justice 
prostrate may no doubt have its admirers. Nevertheless, the spirit 
of justice does not reside in forms of formalities, or in technicalities, 
nor is the triumph of the administration of justice to be found 
in successfully picking one’s way between pitfalls of technicality. 
Law and its technical rules ought to be but a handmaid of justice 
and legal inflexibility (which may be becoming of law) may, if 
strictly followed, only serve to render justice grotesque or even 
lead to outright injustice. The court will not endure that mere 
form or fiction of law, introduced for the scale of justice, should 
work a wrong, contrary to the truth and substance of the case 
before it.
As the Philippines Court of Appeal also put it in Aguam vs. Court of 
Appeals3 : 
1  [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER Rep 233.
2  (1986) 12 iLAW/SC.104/1985  
3  388 Phil. 587 (2000).
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Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors 
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court’s primary 
duty is to render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game 
of technicalities. Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a 
rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an 
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, 
deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be 
decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party 
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper 
and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable 
plea of technicalities.
It is quite clear that the legal reasoning of the three judges was fatally 
flawed and defied comparative jurisprudence from around the world. 
The petitioners were denied the panoply of their due process rights 
guaranteed under the Zambian constitution – the right to be heard by 
an impartial tribunal. The technical argument used by Justices Mulonda, 
Mulenga and Sitale was simply an excuse and does not appear to be the 
real reason for their conduct. This judgment indicates that there is no clear 
separation between the judicial and executive branches of government 
and that this lack of separation has led to a harmful politicization of the 
judicial system. The Judiciary branch of government is clearly beholden 
and subservient to the Executive branch, and the courts are plagued by 
political influence. Moreover, the lack of a transparent system for the 
appointment of judges and the concentration of the appointment system 
in the presidency has meant that appointments and promotions in the 
judiciary are based on political patronage rather than merit, undermining 
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